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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 920114 
Ct. of App. No. 900473-CA 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Category No. 14 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that 
"intent to defraud" is not an element of securities fraud under 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) and properly uphold the trial 
court's instructions on the requisite mental state for a criminal 
violation of that statute? 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that 
the trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in 
admitting expert testimony on the issue of "materiality"? 
"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a 
question of law, and [an appellate court] always reviewfs] 
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule 
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court," 
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial 
court exercised its discretion unreasonably. State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented for review is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with numerous offenses, 
including eighteen counts of securities fraud under Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) 
(amended 1990, 1991, 1992) (R. 511-26). After the trial court 
granted defendant's motion to sever (R. 1023), he was tried on 
the eighteen counts of securities fraud. A jury found him guilty 
on all counts (R. 1434-51). 
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three 
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run 
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on 
each count (R. 1474-91). The execution of the sentence was 
stayed until resolution of the' other counts charged in the 
information (ibid.). Defendant filed a petition for a 
2 
certificate of probable cause which was eventually granted, and 
defendant is currently free on bail. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
defendant's convictions. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 
App. 1992). This Court granted certiorari. State v. Larsen. 836 
P.2d 1385 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the questions presented for review, a statement 
of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is 
unnecessary. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Criminal liability for a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) does not require proof of intent to defraud in 
addition to proof of willfulness. Therefore, the court of 
appeals correctly upheld the trial court's instructions to the 
jury which defined "willfully" as the culpable mental state for 
the crime of securities fraud under section 61-1-1(2). 
Additionally, because section 61-1-1(2) does not require proof of 
an intent to defraud, the court of appeals correctly upheld the 
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction 
on the defense of "good faith." 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the court of 
appeals, applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, 
incorrectly upheld the trial court's admission of expert 
testimony on the issue of "materiality." In light of case law 
from this court and the federal courts interpreting rules 702 and 
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704 of the Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals properly 
concluded that the trial court had reasonably exercised its 
discretion in admitting the expert testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE 
MENTAL STATE FOR A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 61-1-1(2) (1989) WERE PROPER; IT 
ALSO CORRECTLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that the trial court correctly refused to give two of his 
requested jury instructions concerning the elements of and 
defenses to securities fraud. The first of those instructions 
would have told the jury that, for purposes of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 
1990, 1991, 1992)1, an act or omission "is done 'wilfully' if 
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent 
to do something the law forbids; that is to say with bad purpose 
either to disobey or disregard the law[,] . . . the bad purpose 
• . . be[ing] the specific intent to defraud." Defendant's 
Requested Jury Instr. No. 5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of 
Pet.). The second would have instructed the jury that "a 
representation made by the Defendant in good faith constitutes a 
complete defense to a charge of Securities Fraud." Defendant's 
1
 Hereafter, all references to Title 61 provisions are to 
the 1989 volume of the Code. 
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Requested Jury Instr. No. 30 (R. 1381) (Appendix B to Br. of 
Pet.). 
The trial court purported to give defendant's 
instruction no. 5 in substance, excising the references to bad 
purpose and intent to defraud and simply instructing the jury 
that the culpable mental state for securities fraud is 
Mwillfully.,, Jury Instr. Nos. 14# 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312, 1313) 
(Appendix C to Br. of Pet.). The court refused to give 
defendant's good faith instruction; however, it informed the jury 
that "ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable 
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime." 
Jury Instr. No. 17A (R. 1313). 
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial 
court's instructions. Defendant asserts this was error. In that 
the court of appeals' holding is based on an interpretation of 
statutes, that holding is reviewed for correctness. See Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of 
statute involves question of law reviewed for correctness); State 
v. Macruire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (no deference accorded court 
of appeals' conclusion on question of law). 
Defendant claims that United States Supreme Court cases 
interpreting federal securities laws dictate that section 61-1-
1(2) be interpreted to require proof of "scienter" (i.e., intent 
to defraud, manipulate, or deceive)2, and therefore the trial 
2
 Defendant uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State 
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court and the court of appeals incorrectly concluded otherwise. 
Furthermore, he claims that because a good faith defense goes 
hand-in-hand with the intent to defraud element, the trial court 
incorrectly refused to give the requested good faith instruction. 
The court of appeals rejected defendant's arguments on 
the ground that the "Utah Code specifies willfulness as the 
culpable mental state for securities fraud" and the trial court's 
"instruction on willfulness mirrorfed] the statutory definition." 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Although the court of appeals' 
analysis might have been more thorough, its approval of the trial 
court's instructions is correct. 
A, Intent to Defraud 
As defendant notes, in 1963 the legislature 
substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, calling it the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. See § 61-1-1 et sea.: Unif. 
Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 515-680 (1985) (hereafter cited as 
Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. ). Section 61-1-1, which is at issue in 
this case, is nearly identical to section 101 of the Uniform 
Securities Act. Section 101 contains the same language as 
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10b-5 (rule 
10b-5). As the official comments to the Uniform Securities Act 
make clear, section 101 "is substantially the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5, which in turn was modeled 
upon § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)." 
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud." 
6 
Official Comment, Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 516. 
Section 61-1-27 provides that the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act "may be so construed as to effect its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it 
and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added). 
Relying on this section and the history of the Uniform Securities 
Actf defendant argues that, because the United States Supreme 
Court has held that a civil action under rule 10b-5 requires 
proof of an intent to defraud, a criminal prosecution under 
section 61-1-1(2) necessarily requires proof of intent to defraud 
in addition to proof of willfulness. However, this argument 
ignores the plain language of the pertinent statutes and, 
alternatively, misapplies the Supreme Court decisions. 
1. Plain Language 
Defendant was convicted under section 61-1-1(2), which 
makes it 
unlawful for any person, in connection with 
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, 
directly or indirectly to . . . make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
are made, not misleading[.] 
Criminal liability attaches when a person "willfully" violates 
that provision. § 61-1-21. Nothing in the plain language of 
sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 gives rise to an intent to defraud 
element. Those sections are clear and unambiguous: securities 
fraud is committed when a person "willfully" makes a misstatement 
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or an omission of a material fact. "Willfully" is defined 
elsewhere in the Code to mean the same thing as "intentionally" 
or "with intent." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1990)3. There 
is no reference to the additional element of "intent to defraud." 
Defendant reaches far beyond the plain language of the 
statutes to construe section 61-1-1(2) as requiring an intent to 
defraud in addition to the element of willfulness. He ignores 
the settled principle that, in determining legislative intent, 
this Court begins with a statute's plain language and will resort 
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language 
of the statute is ambiguous. See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). He also fails to acknowledge that 
when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, an appellate court 
construes those terms in accord with their usual and accepted 
meaning. State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 15 n.27 (Utah 
Mar. 11, 1992). This Court has correctly rejected defendant's 
approach in a similar case. 
In State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983) 
(per curiam), the defendant argued that the trial court "erred in 
failing to instruct that intent to defraud is a necessary element 
of a bad check charge." The Court rejected this argument on the 
ground that "the offense calls for no such element." Ibid. 
3
 Section 76-2-103(1) provides: "A person engages in 
conduct . . . [iIntentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result" (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, the legislature had eliminated the "intent to defraud" 
element from the statute, making it clear that "[t]he element of 
'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a 
conviction." Ibid. See also State v. Bercrwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 
511 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that intent to defraud an insurance 
company is not an element of aggravated arson because such an 
intent is not contained in the plain language of the statute). 
The court of appeals correctly looked to the plain 
language of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 in concluding that the 
culpable mental state for a criminal violation of section 61-1-
1(2) is "willfully." It properly rejected defendant's argument 
that intent to defraud is a required, additional mental element 
of the offense. ££.. State v. Facer. 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 
1976) (identifying "intentionally" as the culpable mental state 
for securities fraud). Other courts interpreting similar 
statutes have concluded that the plain language requires nothing 
more than proof the defendant acted "willfully." For instance, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, interpreting securities fraud 
statutes nearly identical to sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, held 
that Wisconsin's false statement provision did not require an 
intent to defraud because the statute "makes no reference to 
intent to defraud." State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 528, 322 
N.W.2d 522, 526 (1982). Relying on the principle that "[w]hen 
statutory language is unambiguous, th[e] court will arrive at the 
intent of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary and 
accepted meaning," the court of appeals concluded that "had the 
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legislature wanted to require specific intent to defraud, it 
would have explicitly stated so." 108 Wis.2d at 530, 322 N.W.2d 
at 527. Rather, the legislature had identified "wilfully" as the 
culpable mental state. 108 Wis.2d at 529-30, 322 N.W.2d at 526-
27. 
In a similar context, the California Court of Appeal, 
construing California's securities fraud laws, stated: 
It is settled that the omission of 
"knowingly" from a penal statute indicates 
that guilty knowledge is not an element of 
the offense. Had the Legislature intended to 
require proof of guilty knowledge or scienter 
under section 25540, it could have so stated 
by using the word "knowingly." Willfulness 
does not require proof of evil motive or 
intent to violate the law or knowledge of 
illegality. 
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369 
(1989). 
Additionally, a survey of the Utah Code reveals that 
when the legislature intended to make intent to defraud the 
culpable mental state for an offense, it used the words "intent 
to defraud." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-27 (1991), 39-6-
104(4) (1988), 41-la-1319 (Supp. 1992), 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1992), 
76-6-518 (1990), 76-10-706 (1990), 76-10-1006 (1990). Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(9)(c) (1992) ("The commission or court 
need not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraud . . . to 
establish willfulness under this section."). This further 
supports the court of appeals' plain language approach and its 
ultimate rejection of defendant's proposed construction of 
section 61-1-1(2). 
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2. Beyond the Plain Language 
Even if this Court were to accept defendant's 
invitation to look beyond the plain language of the statutes, he 
ignores pertinent language in the official comments to the 
Uniform Securities Act and misapplies the United States Supreme 
Court decisions he claims are controlling. 
Defendant contends that because the source of section 
61-1-1 — section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act — is 
substantially rule 10b-5, Utah's statute must be interpreted in 
the criminal context as the Supreme Court has construed rule 10b-
5 in civil actions. He bases this contention on section 61-1-27, 
which provides that Utah's securities fraud laws "may be so 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to • . . 
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter 
with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added). 
An initial problem with this position is that section 
61-1-27 says Utah's securities act "may," rather than "shall," be 
construed to coordinate its interpretation with related federal 
regulation. The Uniform Securities Act contains a "shall" 
provision: "This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration 
of this act with the related federal regulation." Unif. Act 
S 415, 7B U.L.A. 678. Defendant does not note or discuss this 
significant difference between Utah's law and the Uniform 
Securities Act. Indeed, this distinction undermines the basic 
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premise of his argument: that "the Utah Act must be construed to 
effectuate this 'general purpose' r'to coordinate the 
interpretation of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation'1." Br. of Pet. at 9-10 (first emphasis added). The 
truth is the legislature preferred a more flexible approach which 
does not bind Utah's courts to federal court interpretations of 
federal securities laws. 
But even beyond this defect in defendant's argument, 
neither the Supreme Court cases nor the official comments to the 
Uniform Securities Act dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be 
interpreted to require an intent to defraud. 
The Supreme Court Cases 
Defendant relies principally on Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). There, the issue was "whether 
an action for civil damages may lie under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the 
defendant." 425 U.S. at 187-88.4 Based on a review of the 
4
 Section 10b, from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it 
"'unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.'" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 78j) • Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any 
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plain language of section 10(b) and its legislative history, the 
Court held that a private cause of action for damages will not 
lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 -in the absence of any 
allegation of 'scienter' — intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.- id. at 193. 
Relying on this language from Hochfelder, defendant 
asserts that criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) will not 
lie unless there is proof of intent to defraud in addition to 
proof of willfulness. Defendant erroneously views Hochfelder in 
isolation and fails to give due consideration to at least one 
other significant Supreme Court case. 
When the Court decided Hochfelder, it "was primarily 
concerned with rejecting Hochfelder's contention that mere 
negligent omissions sufficed to establish a claim under Rule 10b-
5." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2nd Cir. 
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
13 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197. In concluding that a private action 
under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 requires an allegation of 
"scienter," Hochfelder did not thoroughly analyze the specific 
language of rule 10b-5; rather, the Court focused primarily on 
the language of § 10(b) and its legislative history. See 425 
U.S. at 212. The Court noted that rule 10b-5 "was a hastily 
drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional 
misconduct . . . [and,] [a]lthough adopted pursuant to § 10(b), 
the language of the Rule appears to have been derived in 
significant part from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q." 
425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32. Thus, if the language of rule 10b-5, 
which provided the model for section 101 of the Uniform 
Securities Act, is to be fairly interpreted in light of all the 
relevant Supreme Court case law, this Court must also examine 
decisions interpreting section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 
Section 17(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails, directly or 
indirectly — 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or 
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deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. S 17q(a). The language of this statute is very similar 
to that of rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1. In fact, section 61-1-
1(2) is a mirror image of section 17(a)(2). The Supreme Court 
determined what mental state is required for a violation of 
section 17(a) in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
There, the Court held that under section 17(a), 
"scienter" (i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) is 
required for subsection (1) but not subsections (2) and (3). 446 
U.S. at 697. Focusing on the plain language of subsection (2), 
the language at issue in the instant case (see 61-1-1(2)), the 
Court said: 
[T]he language of § 17(a)(2), which 
prohibits any person from obtaining money or 
property "by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact or any omission to state a 
material fact," is devoid of any suggestion 
whatsoever of a scienter requirement. As a 
well-known commentator has noted, "[t]here is 
nothing on the face of Clause (2) itself 
which smacks of scienter or intent to 
defraud." 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 
1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court in 
Hochfelder pointed out that the similar 
language of Rule 10b-5(b) "could be read as 
proscribing . . . any type of material 
misstatement or omission . . . that has the 
effect of defrauding investors, whether the 
wrongdoing was intentional or not." 
Id. at 696 (citation omitted). 
In short, contrary to defendant's contention, the 
Supreme Court case law interpreting related federal regulation 
does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to require 
proof of an intent to defraud. Aaron's analysis of section 
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17(a), which through rule 10b-5 was a model for section 101 of 
the Uniform Securities Act and therefore section 61-1-1, is at 
least as instructive as Hochfelder when it comes to interpreting 
section 61-1-1(2). Thus, it is not surprising that several state 
courts have relied on Aaron in holding that their 61-1-1(2)-type 
provisions do not require an intent to defraud. See, e.g., State 
v. Tembv, 108 Wis. at 528-29, 322 N.W.2d at 526-27; People v. 
Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 334-35, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982). 
Official Comments to the Uniform Securities Act 
An additional flaw in defendant's argument becomes 
apparent when the official comments to pertinent provisions of 
the Uniform Securities Act are examined. Section 409 of the Act 
provides that criminal liability attaches when a person 
"willfully" violates a provision of the Act. The Utah 
Legislature adopted a similar provision in section 61-1-21 which, 
as previously noted, sets forth the willfulness requirement for 
criminal liability. 
The official comment to section 409 refers the reader 
to the comment under section 204(a)(2)(B) for "the meaning of 
'willfully.'" Official Comment, Unif. Act S 409, 7B U.L.A. 632. 
That comment states in pertinent part: 
As the federal courts and the SEC have 
construed the term "willfully" in § 15(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(b), all that is required is 
proof that the person acted intentionally in 
the sense that he was aware of what he was 
doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to 
violate the law, or knowledge that the law 
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was being violated is not required. 
Official Comment, Unif. Act S 204(a)(2)(B), 7B U.L.A. 545. This 
passage expressly condemns the "specific intent to violate the 
law/bad purpose" element of defendant's requested instruction no. 
5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of Pet.). It also seriously 
undercuts defendant's argument that to establish a criminal 
violation of section 61-1-1(2) there must be proof of intent to 
defraud in addition to proof of willfulness. 
Significant State and Federal Criminal Cases 
Defendant also fails to give due weight to either the 
substantial state case law holding that an intent to defraud is 
not an element of 61-1-1(2)-type statutes or the handful of 
federal securities fraud decisions that have addressed the 
"scienter" question in the criminal context. 
On the state level, numerous courts have held that 
intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of securities 
fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2); proof that the 
defendant acted "willfully" is all that is required. See, e.g., 
People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08 
(1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v. Johnson, 
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review denied 
(Cal. Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433 
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v. 
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v. 
Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v. 
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v. 
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Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983). 
See also Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F. 
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes). 
Except for Illinois, all of the states represented in these 
decisions have, like Utah, substantially adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act. Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 509-14. Therefore, the 
decisions are instructive, if not persuasive, authority. See 
State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (relying on 
decision from Michigan, another Uniform Securities Act state, 
when interpreting a provision of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act). 
Although defendant criticizes these state cases as 
inconsistent with Hochfelder, the previous discussion of 
Hochfelder demonstrates that defendant's reliance on that case as 
the controlling authority is not sound. And, while defendant 
finds some support for his position in State v. Puckett, 
6 Kan.App.2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152 (1981), aff'd, 230 Kan. 296, 
640 P.2d 1198 (1982), and People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476, 
563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1977) (but see People v. Blair, 579 P.2d 
1133, 1138-39 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (which supports the State's 
position)), those decisions appear to represent a minority view. 
Furthermore, defendant's attempt to distinguish some of 
the contrary state decisions on the ground that they do not 
address statutory provisions similar to section 61-1-27, fails 
because he misreads section 61-1-27 as setting forth a "specific 
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legislative directive . . . to construe [the uniform securities] 
laws in accordance with the related federal regulation." Br. of 
Pet. at 13 (emphasis added). As previously noted, under section 
61-1-27 the courts "may" construe Utah's laws to coordinate with 
the related federal regulation; the legislature did not mandate 
that they do so. Therefore, as both the trial court and the 
court of appeals were free to do, this Court may interpret 
section 61-1-1(2) not to require an intent to defraud, regardless 
of what conclusions the federal courts may have reached with 
respect to the related federal regulation. 
Finally, defendant overlooks several post-Hochfelder 
criminal 10b-5 cases that have upheld jury instructions similar 
to those given in defendant's case. In United States v. 
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2nd Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 
445 U.S. 222 (1980), a major issue was "the level of intent 
necessary to support a conviction for criminal violations of Rule 
10b-5." 588 F.2d at 1370. Under 15 U.S.C. S 78ff, criminal 
liability attaches for "willful" violations of any securities 
rule or regulation (this is the federal counterpart to Utah's 
section 61-1-21). The trial court had instructed the jury 
that it could not convict Chiarella unless it 
found that he had acted "knowingly" and 
"willfully," and defined these terms to mean 
that "the defendant must be aware of what he 
was doing and what he was not doing" and that 
he must be acting deliberately, and not as a 
result of "innocent mistakes, negligence, or 
inadvertence or other innocent conduct." 
588 F.2d at 1370. Just as defendant does here, Chiarella did not 
dispute the trial court's instruction on willfulness but, citing 
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Hochfelder, contended "that when the substantive provisions are 
S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove the additional 
element of specific intent to defraud." Ibid. 
Observing that "Chiarella was convicted under a charge 
requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
engaged in 'knowingly wrongful' misconduct," the Second Circuit 
held that Hochfelder did not require more than this and the trial 
court "correctly refused to charge the jury that the Government 
must prove specific intent to defraud." Id., at 1371. The court 
relied in part on United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341 (7th 
Cir.), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), where in a similar 
vein, the Seventh Circuit held that an indictment was not fatally 
defective because it failed "to allege a specific intent to 
defraud," 537 F.2d at 351-52. 
Thus, the few reported decisions in criminal 10b-5 
cases have rejected defendant's intent to defraud argument. As 
noted in United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 459 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 947 U.S. 551 (2nd Cir. 1991): 
In a criminal case alleging violations of 
SEC rules, § 78ff provides the level of 
intent required for conviction. The 
government must prove willful misconduct, 
which is to say that the defendant was aware 
of what he was doing, that his acts were done 
intentionally and deliberately and not as a 
result of an innocent mistake, negligence or 
inadvertence. See United States v. Dixon. 
536 F.2d 1388, 1395, 1397 (2nd Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 
1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 
445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 
(1979). 
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704 F. Supp. at 459. 
Defendant's Strict Liability Argument 
Defendant suggests that if an intent to defraud element 
is not read into section 61-1-1(2), this "would permit sweeping, 
strict-liability prosecutions." Br. of Pet. at 13 (emphasis 
added). This is simply wrong. To convict under section 61-1-
1(2), the State must prove the defendant acted "willfully," see 
S 61-1-21, a highly culpable mental state. An offense is a 
strict liability offense only when "the statute defining the 
offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited 
by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental 
state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990). 
B. Good Faith Defense 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court 
erroneously rejected his instruction on a "good faith" defense. 
The court of appeals did not explicitly address this point; 
however, its holding concerning an intent to defraud element for 
section 61-1-1(2) effectively disposed of the issue. 
As defendant notes, "[h]and-in-hand with the scienter 
element is the consistent notion that good faith is a defense." 
Br. of Pet. at 11. Yet, because intent to defraud is not an 
element of section 61-1-1(2), a good faith defense is not 
applicable. See, e.g., Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 
828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making clear that the good faith defense 
does not apply to "the defendant's good faith as to the existence 
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of any particular fact or situation," and cautioning that 
although a good faith defense exists with regard to the plan or 
scheme as a whole, "no matter how firmly the defendant may 
believe in the plan, his belief will not justify baseless, false, 
or reckless representations or promises"); United States v. 
Bover, 694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly upheld the 
trial court's refusal to give defendant's good faith instruction. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
THE ISSUE OF "MATERIALITY" 
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the court of 
appeals' holding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the State's expert to give opinion 
testimony concerning the "materiality" of information defendant 
failed to disclose to investors. (Materiality is an element of 
securities fraud which the State must prove under section 61-1-
1(2). Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.) Although the State conceded 
below that the issue was a close one, defendant fails to show 
that the court of appeals erred. 
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of 
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the 
'absence of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Larsen, 828 P.2d at 
492 I quoting Lamb v. Banaart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)). 
See also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long 
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as the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' Utah R. Evid. 702, 
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court 
even if such testimony addresses an 'ultimate issue.'"). Cf. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82 n.3 (w[w]hether a piece of 
evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review 
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule 
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court," 
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial 
court exercised its discretion "unreasonably"). 
Defendant does not challenge the court of appeals' 
standard of review. Moreover, he does not demonstrate that the 
court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court 
reasonably exercised its discretion. In fact, where the issue 
was necessarily a close one, the court of appeals correctly 
deferred to the trial court's decision which was reasonably 
supported by the analysis in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 
179, 183 (5th Cir.), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987), and 
the broad construction this Court recently gave to rules 702 and 
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 332 
n.l ("Case law supports the proposition that an expert may render 
an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime. . . . As long 
as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence to determine a fact in issue,' . . . its admission is 
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generally within the discretion of the trial court[.]"). 
In short, the court of appeals would have been 
justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no 
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision," Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying 
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's 
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted). Defendant 
does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to 
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no 
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. 
The court of appeals relied heavily on Lueben in 
upholding the trial court's evidentiary ruling. In that case, 
the Fifth Circuit, reviewing a conviction for making materially 
false statements to a federally insured savings and loan 
institution, held that the trial court had erroneously excluded 
the testimony of a defense expert witness regarding the 
5
 Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Rule 704 provides: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
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materiality of false statements allegedly made to the financial 
institution. The court rejected the claim that the expert's 
opinions constituted legal conclusions and therefore were 
inadmissible under rule 704, Federal Rules of Evidence. It 
reasoned that "Lueben sought to ask [the expert] the factual 
question of whether false statements in this case would have 'the 
capacity to influence' a loan officer of a savings and loan 
institution, not the legal question of whether the statements 
were 'material.'" 812 F.2d at 184.6 
The court of appeals likened the testimony of the 
State's expert in defendant's case to the fact-oriented inquiry 
on materiality discussed in Lueben: 
[W]e are persuaded by Lueben that use of the 
term "material" may be admitted as 
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon 
review of the record, we conclude that the 
expert in this case used the term "material" 
in a factual sense. 
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493. 
Defendant criticizes the court of appeals' reliance on 
Lueben and focuses on three cases: Scop v. United States, 846 
F.2d 135 (2nd Cir.), modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1988); 
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); and Adalman v. Baker, 
6
 The Fifth Circuit's modification of its original opinion 
did not appear to disturb the substance of its analysis on this 
point. Although in its modifying opinion the court held that the 
question of "materiality" was a legal question for the judge, 
rather than a fact question for the jury, it did not criticize 
the original opinion's analysis of the rule 704 issue. Lueben, 
816 F.2d at 1033. 
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Watts & Cow 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals 
correctly distinguished these cases from Lueben on the ground 
that they illustrate the inadmissibility of legal conclusions by 
an expert under rule 704. For example, in Scop, the court was 
troubled because the expert "made no attempt to couch the opinion 
testimony at issue in even conclusory factual statements but drew 
directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying 
regulations concerning 'manipulation' and f fraud.'ft 846 F.2d at 
140. The court commented that "[h]ad the expert merely testified 
that controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here can 
create artificial price levels to lure outside investors, no 
sustainable objection could have been made." Ibid. 
In Marx, the court held that the trial court erred in 
allowing an expert witness, who was qualified as an expert in 
securities regulation, to give his opinion as to the legal 
obligations of the parties under a contract. The court first 
noted that "[t]estimony concerning the ordinary practices of 
those engaged in the securities business is admissible under the 
same theory as testimony concerning the ordinary practices of 
physicians or concerning other trade customs: to enable the jury 
to evaluate the conduct of the parties against the standards of 
ordinary practice in the industry." 550 F.2d at 509. However, 
it concluded that the expert's testimony "did not concern only 
the customary practices of a trade or business;" the expert had 
improperly rendered legal opinions as to the meaning of the 
contract terms at issue. Id. at 509-10. 
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And, in Adalman, a party sought to have an expert 
witness "testify as to his conclusion that the applicable law did 
not require the disclosure of . . . omitted information [in a 
securities offering]." 807 F.2d at 365. In upholding the trial 
court's exclusion of such testimony, the court, relying heavily 
on Marx, observed that "it is obvious that [the party] proffered 
[the expert] to testify in substantial part to the meaning and 
the applicability of the securities laws to the transactions 
here, giving his expert opinion on the governing law[;] this 
flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and logic of that 
precedent — set out in Marx." Id. at 368. 
Reading SCOP, Marx, Adalman, and Lueben together in an 
effort to apply them to the instant case is indeed a difficult 
task. See Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.) 
("There is no bright line between permissible questions under 
Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal responses."), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). At first blush, it might 
appear that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
the expert's opinions. However, unlike the testimony in Scop, 
Marx and Adalman, the expert's testimony here did not constitute 
a legal opinion. His testimony was more akin to the opinion 
testimony on the factual question discussed in Lueben: whether 
the false statements had the capacity to influence. While it 
clearly would have been better for the expert to steer away from 
the term "material," he appears to have used the term not in the 
legal sense but rather in the factual sense of what the ordinary 
27 
practice in the industry is, or what would be important to or 
have the capacity to influence an investor. In any event, the 
testimony appears to be well within the limits of rule 704 as 
defined in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n.l, where this Court 
noted that "[c]ase law supports the proposition that an expert 
may render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime" 
and then cited with apparent approval the following casess 
United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(officer of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was allowed 
to testify that a device was a firearm subject to registration 
with the Bureau); United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th 
Cir. 1981) (expert properly testified that funds were improperly 
taken from corporation); and United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 
187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975) (expert properly testified that certain 
drugs come within a particular statutory classification). 
In sum, in light of Lueben and this Court's expansive 
interpretation of rules 702 and 704 in Span (relying on federal 
cases), the court of appeals did not err in holding that the 
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in admitting the 
expert testimony under rules 702 and 704. See State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (the appellate courts of this 
state look to the interpretation of the federal rules of evidence 
by the federal courts to aid in interpreting Utah's rules of 
evidence). As the court of appeals correctly observed, "[i]n 
general, expert testimony is suitable in securities fraud cases 
because the technical nature of securities is not within the 
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knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common 
experience and would help the jury understand the issues before 
them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492 (citing rule 702 and Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)).7 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c*/ day of December, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 Defendant claims that the court of appeals "apparently 
read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it 
goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is 
not a legal conclusion." Br. of Pet. at 24-25. However, this is 
refuted by the court's clear statement that "[d]espite the 
appropriateness of expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 
704 was not intended to allow experts to give legal conclusions." 
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493. 
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